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Abstract
We prove that the constructive weighted coalitional manipulation problem for the
Schulze voting rule can be solved in polynomial time for an unbounded number of
candidates and an unbounded number of manipulators.
1 Introduction
The Schulze voting rule [10] is a recent method for preference aggregation among a group
of agents or voters. Because of its many desirable mathematical properties, it has attracted
a lot of attention in collective decision making and has found its way into implementations
for various applications.
However, several studies have also suggested that the Schulze voting rule is vulner-
able to voting manipulation (aka strategic voting). In the light of the famous Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem, which in principle excludes truthful voting in most cases, voting ma-
nipulation could be made prohibitive by using computational hardness (cf., e.g., [1, 2, 3]).
Unfortunately, the manipulation problem for Schulze voting has been shown to be solvable
in polynomial time for many computational scenarios.
Parkes and Xia [9] showed that constructive unweighted coalitional manipulation (UCM)
for one single manipulator and destructive UCM for an arbitrary number of manipulators
are solvable in polynomial time. Building on this work, Gaspers et al. [4] found that con-
structive UCM is polynomial-time computable and established that constructive weighted
∗Work done in part while the first author was with University of Konstanz; material is based upon the
first author’s bachelor’s thesis [8].
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coalitional manipulation (WCM) is fixed-parameter tractable (in the number of candidates)
in the co-winner model. In addition, Hemaspaandra, Lavaee, and Menton [5] proved that
constructive WCM in the unique-winner model and destructive WCM in both models are
also fixed-parameter tractable.
We improve on these results and give an algorithm that solves constructive WCM in
polynomial time even for an unbounded number of candidates. As the Parkes-Xia algorithm
[9] for destructive UCM is easily adaptable to destructive WCM in both the unique and
the co-winner model,1 all open problems identified in [5] regarding the complexity of WCM
for Schulze voting are thus settled: they are all polynomial-time computable.
2 The Schulze voting rule
Voting. Let X = {x1, . . . , xm} be a finite, non-empty set of m alternatives or candidates,
and let A = {a1, . . . , an} be a finite, non-empty multi-set of n agents or voters. We assume
that each voter ai has a weight wi ∈ N \ {0}; e.g., ai could stand representatively for a
coalition of wi unanimous voters. Each voter ai ∈ A imposes a total order on the set
of candidates which expresses ai’s preferences and which is called ai’s vote; more specifi-
cally, a vote of voter ai ∈ A is given by a bijective function πi : X → {1, . . . ,m}, where
πi(x) > πi(y) means that ai strictly prefers x to y. (Note that incomparable candidates
are excluded.) A weighted voting profile is a sequence (π,w) = (π1, . . . , πn;w1, . . . , wn)
containing a vote (of weight wi) from each voter ai.
A voting rule is a mapping F : (π1, . . . , πn;w1, . . . , wn) 7→ P+(X), i.e., F assigns a non-
empty set of candidates to each possible weighted voting profile (π1, . . . , πn;w1, . . . wn).
If F (π1, . . . , πn;w1, . . . , wn) is a singleton-set then the winning candidate is called unique
winner of the election under voting rule F ; if F (π1, . . . , πn;w1, . . . , wn) contains at least
two candidates then these candidates are called co-winners under F .
Weighted majority graph. The Schulze voting rule is based on the method of pairwise
comparisons. Given a weighted voting profile (π,w) = (π1, . . . , πn;w1, . . . , wn) and distinct
candidates x, y ∈ X, let ω(π,w)(x, y) denote the number of voters that strictly prefer x to
y minus the number of voters that strictly prefer y to x, i.e.,
ω(π,w)(x, y) =def
∑
πi(x)>πi(y)
wi −
∑
πi(y)>πi(x)
wi.
So, if ω(π,w)(x, y) > 0 then the majority of voters prefers x to y.
The outcomes of the pairwise comparisons are collected as edge annotations to the
complete directed graph K = (X,E) on vertex set X, i.e, the edge set of K is E =
X × X \ { (x, x) | x ∈ X }. In particular, for weight function ω(π,w) : E → Z : (x, y) 7→
ω(π,w)(x, y), the skew-symmetric graph (K,ω(π,w)) is the weighted majority graph for the
weighted voting profile (π,w). In the forthcoming, we also consider weight functions for
K that do not necessarily correspond to voting profiles.
1Since all manipulators in the Parkes-Xia algorithm vote in the same way, weights actually do not matter
for the construction of preference profiles. Furthermore, the number of manipulators and non-manipulators
has no influence on the runtime of the core algorithm except for computing the weighted majory graph
and outputting the preference profiles (for the relevant notions, see Sect. 2). Thus, the algorithm runs in
polynomial time on weighted instances.
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Schulze method. The Schulze voting rule evaluates the weighted majority graph in a specific
path-based way. For our purposes, it is useful to introduce the relevant notions for a
weighted graph (K,ω) equipped with an arbitrary weight function ω : E → Z. For each
path p = (v1, . . . , vℓ) in (K,ω), the strength s[ω](p) of path p is defined to be the minimum
weight of two candidates consecutively occurring on p, i.e.,
s[ω](p) =def min { ω(vi, vi+1) | i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ− 1} }.
For distinct candidates x and y, the path strength S[ω](x, y) is defined to be the maximum
strength of an (x, y)-path in (K,ω), i.e.,
S[ω](x, y) =def max { s[ω](p) | p is an (x, y)-path in (K,ω) }.
Finally, a candidate x ∈ X is a Schulze winner for weighted voting profile (π,w) if and
only if S[ω(π,w)](x, y) ≥ S[ω(π,w)](y, x) for all candidates y ∈ X \ {x}.
The following proposition summarizes both that the Schulze voting rule is, indeed, well-
defined and that deciding whether there is a unique Schulze winner is also easily possible.
Proposition 2.1. Let (π,w) be any weighted voting profile for candidate set X and voter
set A.
1. [10] There always exists a Schulze winner for the weighted voting profile (π,w).
2. [9] A candidate x ∈ X is a unique Schulze winner for weighted voting profile (π,w)
if and only if S[ω(π,w)](x, y) > S[ω(π,w)](y, x) for all y ∈ X \ {x}.
3 Unique-Winner Weighted Coalitional Manipulation
Voting manipulation consists of fixing the voting behavior of a coalition of manipulators
in order to make a certain candidate the winner of the election. More specifically, we
consider the following computational problem for finding a unique winner with respect to
the Schulze voting rule (the co-winner version will be discussed in Sect. 4):
Problem: Unique-Winner WCM
Instance: A candidate set X, weighted voting profile (π1, . . . , πk;w1, . . . , wk) of
non-manipulators, weights (wk+1, . . . , wn) of manipulators, and manip-
ulation candidate c ∈ X
Task: Find votes πk+1, . . . , πn such that c is a unique Schulze winner for the
weighted voting profile (π1, . . . , πn;w1, . . . , wn), or indicate non-existence
The following theorem is the key to a polynomial algorithm forUnique-Winner WCM.
Theorem 3.1. Let (X, (π, . . . , πk), (w1, . . . , wn), c) be a Unique-Winner WCM instance.
There is a (finite) function U : X → Z which can be computed in polynomial time such
that the following two statements are equivalent:
1. There exist votes (πk+1, . . . , πn) such that c is a unique Schulze winner for the
weighted voting profile (π1, . . . , πn;w1, . . . , wn).
2. U(x) > ω(π1,...,πk;w1,...,wk)(x, c) − (wk+1 + · · · +wn) for all x ∈ X \ {c}.
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In Lemma 3.4, we will see that the function U can be computed in (non-optimal) time
O(m5) (for an O(m3) bound, see [8]), given the weighted majority graph. Together with
checking the second condition of Theorem 3.1 for m−1 candidates, this gives an algorithm
whose running time is dominated by the time needed for computing the function U . Note
that it takes O(nm2) steps to compute the weighted majority graph in the first place.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is split into two parts, each of which is covered by its own
subsection. Subsection 3.1 (necessity) describes an algorithm for computing the function
U and proves its correctness given that there exist manipulator’s votes to make c a unique
Schulze winner. Subsection 3.2 (sufficiency) describes an algorithm for using the function
U to determine the manipulator’s votes, given that the second condition of Theorem 3.1 is
satisfied. Formally, Theorem 3.1 follows from Lemma 3.4 and Corollary 3.8.
3.1 Computing the function U
Notation. We use the following notations for successfulUnique-Winner WCM instances:
(π◦, w◦) denotes the weighted voting profile of the non-manipulators, i.e., π◦ = (π1, . . . , πk)
and w◦ = (w1, . . . , wk); (π
•, w•) denotes a successfully manipulating weighted voting pro-
file of the manipulators, i.e., π• = (πk+1, . . . , πn) and w
• = (wk+1, . . . , wn) such that
the first condition of Theorem 3.1 is satisfied; (π◦•, w◦•) denotes a successfully manip-
ulating weighted voting profile of non-manipulators and manipulators, i.e., (π◦•, w◦•) =
(π◦π•;w◦w•). Likewise, we use ω◦, ω•, and ω◦• to denote the edge weight function of the
weighted majority graph with respect to the corresponding scenarios. Let W denote the
total weight of manipulators, i.e., W =def wk+1 + · · · +wn.
Algorithm. The following algorithm contains a description of how to compute function U :
Input: graph (K,ω◦) = (X,E, ω◦), candidate c ∈ X, total weight W of
manipulators
Output: (finite) function U : X → Z
begin
U(c)←∞;
foreach x ∈ X \ {c} do
U(x)← max { ω◦(y, z) | y, z ∈ X, y 6= z }+W ;
while Rule 1 or Rule 2 is applicable to U do
apply the rule;
return U ;
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for computing U
While computing U , Algorithm 1 maintains the following invariant:
For any successfully manipulating weighted profile (π◦•, w◦•), we have U(x) >
S[ω◦•](x, c) for all candidates x ∈ X \ {c}.
We observe that the initialization of U(x) satisfies the invariant, as S[ω◦•](c, x) cannot
exceed U(x) for any x ∈ X. The following rules are used in Algorithm 1:2
2Gaspers et al. [4], in their algorithm which has the same structure as ours, used three rules. The reason
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• Rule 1. If there is a candidate x 6= c such that S[ω′](c, x) < U(x) when using weight
function ω′ : E → Z : (y, z) 7→ min { ω◦(y, z) +W,U(z) }, set U(x)← S[ω′](c, x).
• Rule 2. If there are candidates x, y ∈ X \ {c} such that U(y) < U(x) and ω◦(y, x)−
W ≥ U(y), set U(x)← U(y).
Lemma 3.2. Rule 1 is correct.
Proof. Suppose that the invariant is violated for the first time after the rule has been
applied, so S[ω′](c, x) = U(x) ≤ S[ω◦•](x, c). Since c is the unique winner for profile
(π◦•, w◦•), there exists a (c, x)-path p such that s[ω◦•](p) > S[ω◦•](x, c). Thus, p must
satisfy s[ω◦](p)+W ≥ s[ω◦•](p) > S[ω′](c, x) ≥ s[ω′](p), so there must be a candidate y on
path p with U(y) ≤ S[ω′](c, x). Let p′ denote the (y, x)-subpath of p. Then, S[ω◦•](y, c) ≥
min{s[ω◦•](p′), S[ω◦•](x, c)} ≥ S[ω′](c, x) ≥ U(y). But this would mean that the invariant
had already been violated before the rule had been applied.
Lemma 3.3. Rule 2 is correct.
Proof. Suppose the invariant is violated for the first time after the rule has been applied
to candidates x and y, i.e., S[ω◦•](x, c) ≥ U(y). Then, S[ω◦•](y, c) ≥ min{w◦(y, x) −
W,S[ω◦•](x, c)} ≥ U(y). This is a contradiction, as it implies that the invariant had
already been violated before the rule was even applied.
Lemma 3.4. Algorithm 1 computes a function U : X → Z in O(m5) time for which
it holds that if the manipulators can vote such that c is the unique Schulze winner, then
U(x) > ω◦(x, c) −W for all x ∈ X \ {c}.
Proof. The runtime bound follows from two observations:
• We can check if and where a rule can be applied and apply it in O(m2) time.
• Whenever a rule is applied at a candidate x, U(x) must strictly decrease. As U(x)
can only assume values from the set { ω◦(y, z) +W | y, z ∈ X }, such a decrease can
only happen at most O(m2) times at one specific candidate, and thus at most O(m3)
times in total.
The inequality is a direct consequence of the invariant.
3.2 Computing the votes of the manipulators
Algorithm. We have seen by now that we can use the function U computed by Algorithm 1
to formulate a necessary condition for when the manipulators can be successful. We will
see now that this necessary condition is also sufficient, as we can then use the function U to
construct votes for the manipulators that make c the unique Schulze winner. Algorithm 2
shows how to construct these votes:
Lemma 3.5. There exists a (c, x)-path in G for all candidates x ∈ X.
that Algorithm 1 runs in polynomial time lies in the difference between their Rule 2, which reduces the
values of the bounds by 2 per application, and our Rule 1, which is more efficient in respect thereof. Rule
3 of Gaspers et al. corresponds to our Rule 2.
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Input: Graph (K,ω◦) = (X,E, ω◦), candidate set X, non-manipulators’ weights
ω◦(x, y), candidate c ∈ X, total weight W of manipulators, function U
computed by Algorithm 1
Output: A complete ranking R that can be voted by all manipulators for a
successful manipulation, if the election can be manipulated
begin
Construct directed graph G = (X,E′) so that, for x 6= y,
(x, y) ∈ E′ ⇐⇒ min { U(x), ω◦(x, y) +W } ≥ U(y);
Compute a spanning arborescence T ⊆ G with root c;
Compute vote ζ : X → {1, . . . ,m} by topologically sorting T such that
(x, y) ∈ E(T ) ∨ U(x) > U(y) =⇒ ζ(x) > ζ(y) for all x, y ∈ X;
return ζ
Algorithm 2: Computation of the votes of the manipulators
Proof. Suppose the claim does not hold, and choose x without a (c, x)-path such that U(x)
is maximum among all candidates without such a path. Since Rule 1 is inapplicable to U ,
there exists a (c, x)-path P = (y1, . . . , yℓ) in K with min{ω
◦(yi−1, yi) +W,U(yi)} ≥ U(x)
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ}. Since ∞ = U(c) > U(x), there is a candidate yi with maximal index
i such that U(yi) > U(x). Let p
′ be the (yi, x)-subpath of p. This path p
′ also exists in G
by construction, and there is also a (c, yi)-path in G due to the maximality of U(x). Thus,
there exists a (c, x)-path in G. This is a contradiction.
Thus, there exists a spanning arborescence T of G rooted at c. From this arborescence,
we can obtain a vote ζ such that if (x, y) ∈ E(T ) ∨ U(x) > U(y) then ζ(x) > ζ(y).
As T does not contain an edge (x, y) ∈ E(T ) with U(x) < U(y), such a vote exists.
We choose all manipulators to vote ζ, so we set π• =def (ζ, . . . , ζ) and (π
◦•, w◦•) =def
(π1, . . . , πk, ζ, . . . , ζ;w1, . . . , wn).
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Lemma 3.6. S[ω◦•](c, x) ≥ U(x) for all candidates x ∈ X \ {c}.
Proof. Let p denote a (c, x)-path p = (y1, . . . , yℓ) in T . All edges in T are also edges in
G, so min{U(yi−1), ω
◦(yi−1, yi) +W} ≥ U(yi) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ}. By a simple inductive
argument and since the vote ζ is consistent with all edges in T , we have ω◦•(yi−1, yi) =
ω◦(yi−1, yi)+W ≥ U(x) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ}. We conclude that S[ω
◦•](c, x) ≥ s[ω◦•](p) ≥
U(x), which proves the claim.
Lemma 3.7. If U(x) > ω◦(x, c) −W for all x ∈ X \ {c}, then U(x) > S[ω◦•](x, c) for all
x ∈ X \ {c}.
Proof. Let p denote any (x, c)-path. We consider two cases:
• Assume that there is a candidate y 6= c on p with U(y) > U(x). Then, choose y among
these candidates closest to x on p, and let z be the candidate immediately preceding
3Notice that this is in contrast to a proposed counterexample against all manipulators being able to vote
the same way in the unique-winner model by Menton and Singh in their preliminary report [7] (but dropped
in the conference version [6]). In that construction, manipulators vote differently in order to get candidate
p strictly above candidate a which in fact, does not guarantee that p is also strictly above candidate c. In
our Algorithm 2, all manipulators vote the same.
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y on p. It must hold that ζ(y) > ζ(z), for U(z) ≤ U(x) < U(y). As Rule 3.1 is not
applicable to U , we obtain that s[ω◦•](p) ≤ ω◦•(z, y) = ω◦(z, y)−W < U(z) ≤ U(x).
• Otherwise, it holds for all candidates y 6= c on p that U(y) ≤ U(x). Let z be the
candidate preceding c on p. Since ∞ = U(c) > U(z), ζ(c) > ζ(z), so we conclude
that s[ω◦•](p) ≤ ω◦•(z, c) = ω◦(z, c) −W < U(z) ≤ U(x).
The claim follows.
Corollary 3.8. If U(x) > ω◦(x, c) −W for all x ∈ X \ {c}, then c is a unique Schulze
winner for weighted voting profile (π1, . . . , πk, ζ, . . . , ζ;w1, . . . , wn).
Proof. We conclude from the previous two lemmas that S[ω◦•](c, x) ≥ U(x) > S[ω◦•](x, c)
for all x ∈ X \ {c}. Hence, c is a unique Schulze winner.
4 Co-winner Weighted Coalitional Manipulation
We briefly discuss the co-winner variant of the weighted coalitional manipulation problem,
i.e., checking whether candidate c can be made a Schulze winner though not the only one
with respect to the same voting profile.
Problem: Co-winner WCM
Instance: A candidate set X, weighted voting profile (π1, . . . , πk;w1, . . . , wk) of
non-manipulators, weights (wk+1, . . . , wn) of manipulators, and manip-
ulation candidate c ∈ X
Task: Find votes πk+1, . . . , πn such that c is a Schulze winner for the weighted
voting profile (π1, . . . , πn;w1, . . . , wn), or indicate non-existence
Following the arguments in Sect. 3 literally, the algorithms for Unique-Winner WCM
can be easily adapted to solve Co-winner WCM. A modification is only required for
Algorithm 1 computing U . In contrast to the unique winner problem, we allow the bounds
in the invariant to be non-strict, i.e., we allow the relaxed inequality U(x) ≥ S[ω◦•](x, c).
This leads to the replacement of Rule 2 by a slightly modified rule:
• Rule 2’. If there are candidates x, y ∈ X \ {c} such that U(x) > U(y) and ω◦(y, x)−
W > U(y), set U(x)← U(y).
With everything else unchanged, we can easily re-prove a slightly different second condition
for a successful manipulation (in the spirit of Theorem 3.1):
Theorem 4.1. Let (X, (π, . . . , πk), (w1, . . . , wn), c) be a Co-winner WCM instance. There
is a (finite) function U : X → Z which can be computed in polynomial time such that the
following two statements are equivalent:
1. There exist votes (πk+1, . . . , πn) such that c is a unique Schulze winner for the
weighted voting profile (π1, . . . , πn;w1, . . . , wn).
2. U(x) ≥ ω(π1,...,πk;w1,...,wk)(x, c) − (wk+1 + · · · +wn) for all x ∈ X \ {c}.
Since the function U can still be computed in time O(m5), Co-winner WCM is solv-
able in polynomial time, too.
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